In this paper, we observe that in the seminal work on indifferentiability analysis of iterated hash functions by Coron et al. and in subsequent works, the initial value (I V ) of hash functions is fixed. In addition, these indifferentiability results do not depend on the Merkle-Damgård (MD) strengthening in the padding functionality of the hash functions. We propose a generic n-bit-iterated hash function framework based on an n-bit compression function called suffix-free-prefix-free (SFPF) that works for arbitrary I V s and does not possess MD strengthening. We formally prove that SFPF is indifferentiable from a random oracle (RO) when the compression function is viewed as a fixed input-length random oracle (FIL-RO). We show that some hash function constructions proposed in the literature fit in the SFPF framework while others that do not fit in this framework are not indifferentiable from a RO. We also show that the SFPF hash function framework with the provision of MD strengthening generalizes any n-bit-iterated hash function based on an n-bit compression function and with an n-bit chaining value that is proven indifferentiable from a RO.
Introduction
The problem. The Merkle-Damgård (MD) hash function construction [9, 19] has influenced the design of many popular hash functions such as the SHA [20] and RIPEMD [10] families. In MD hash functions, a fixed input-length compression function is iterated to hash an arbitrary length message. The MD construction has a security reduction [9, 19] that shows that a collision for the hash function implies a collision for the compression function. This is achieved by including the length of the message as part of the message padding. This technique has been termed MD strengthening [16] . It is interesting to note that the security reduction of the MD construction is valid for arbitrary initial values (I V s). Damgård [9] also observed that a similar reduction is possible in an iterated hash function construction if the IV is fixed but no message length is appended. Preneel [21] recommended fixing the IV as well as employing MD strengthening, and this is also what is used for many hash functions used in practice such as the SHA and RIPEMD families.
At CRYPTO 2005, Coron et al. [7] provided a strong notion of security for hash functions, which requires a hash function to behave like a random oracle (RO) [3] when the underlying building block is a fixed input-length random oracle (FIL-RO) or an ideal cipher. The main application of this property is that any cryptographic protocol proven secure in the RO model will remain secure even if we plug in a hash function satisfying Coron et al. security notion in the place of a hash function that is assumed to be a RO. Under this notion, Coron et al. showed that MD is insecure even if the underlying compression function is an FIL-RO. They also proposed chopMD, three variants of prefix-free MD (PFMD), NMAC, and HMAC constructions as secure variants for the MD construction and proved them as ROs in the indifferentiability security framework of Maurer et al. [18] . Subsequent research either improved [4] [5] [6] 11] or extended the analysis by Coron et al. to other hash function constructions [2, 12] .
We observe that the indifferentiability analysis of the MD variants by Coron et al. [7] and its improvements [4] [5] [6] 11] fix the IV of the hash function constructions and do not depend on the MD strengthening. This observation has led to the following interesting questions: Is it important for these indifferentiability results that the I V stays fixed? If so, then a natural question may be if it is possible to find similar constructions that are indifferentiable from a RO and where it is not necessary that the I V is fixed? What are the advantages of such hash function constructions? In this paper, we aim to seek answers for these questions.
Main contribution. In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the I V of the hash function is not fixed in the hash function specification. We call such designs free-IV hash functions. In these hash functions, the I V becomes just a part of the hash function input and it is under the control of the adversaries who try to analyze the hash functions. We identify properties that are necessary and sufficient for a free-IV hash function to be indifferentiable from the RO. Namely, a free-IV iterated hash function with an underlying FIL-RO compression function must be both prefix-free and suffix-free (SFPF) to be indifferentiable from a RO. We propose a generic n-bit hash function construction called SFPF based on an n-bit FIL-RO compression function without the provision of MD strengthening. We formally prove that the SFPF hash function is indifferentiable from a RO when the underlying compression function is a FIL-RO. This is our main result.
Significance. The main practical benefit of the generic SFPF hash function construction is that it gives a richer space from which one can design hash functions indifferentiable from a RO. The SFPF construction generalizes both the fixed-IV and free-IV hash functions that are indifferentiable from a RO. The SFPF hash framework and its indifferentiability security allows us to better understand the effect of I V s and MD strengthening on the hash function constructions derived from MD in a more formal way than permitted by the prior art. This is further strengthened by the following results derived from our main result:
1. In general, the upper bound of indifferentiability of an n-bit-iterated hash function with n-bit internal state is at most 2 n/2 . For example, constructions such as PFMD, HMAC and NMAC have indifferentiability bound of at most 2 n/2 [4] [5] [6] [7] 11] . As shown in our analysis of SFPF hash function (Sect. 4), an adversary's advantage to differentiate SFPF construction after makingueries is at most 4q 2 /2 n . This leads to an upper bound of indifferentiability of 2 (n−2)/2 for the SFPF construction. In general, this is the indifferentiability bound of an (n −2)-bit-iterated hash function with an internal state of size (n − 2) bits. Thus, the indifferentiability bound of an n-bit SFPF construction is reduced by 2 bits when compared to the general indifferentiability bound of at most 2 n/2 attained by most other n-bit designs with n-bit internal state. This result shows that even by exerting control over the I V s, the adversary gains negligible additional advantage to differentiate the SFPF hash function when compared to a fixed-IV indifferentiable hash function. 2. We show that under the SFPF framework, one variant of PFMD [7] as well as HMAC hash functions is indifferentiable when their IVs are set free. We demonstrate attacks that show that two variants of PFMD [7] are not indifferentiable when their IVs are set free. Similar attacks can be applied on chopMD and NMAC. 3. An interesting consequence of our main result is that we can show that variants of MD that are not indifferentiable from a RO in the free-IV setting (i.e., two variants of PFMD, NMAC, and chopMD [6] ) as indifferentiable designs with the provision of MD strengthening. This feature bears resemblance with collision resistance security reduction of MD framework that also holds only with the provision of MD strengthening even for arbitrary I V s. Therefore, our result implicitly shows the significance of MD strengthening on the indifferentiability security of certain hash function modes.
Security proof methodology.
We prove the indifferentiability security of the SFPF framework by using a game-playing argument, a method that was successfully used in the indifferentiability analysis of the MD variants [2, 7, 12] . Precisely, our method can be seen as a "dual" of the method used to prove the indifferentiability of the EMD construction [2] . However, the indifferentiability security proof of the SFPF hash function has some new techniques compared to those of [2, 7, 12] as briefly noted below:
-The game-playing methodology used in [2, 7, 12] assumes that the I V of these functions is fixed and hence is not directly useful to prove the indifferentiability of the SFPF hash function. For instance, the proofs of [2, 12] use tables and a single tree structure to store adversarial queries/responses and establish connections among the table entries respectively. In contrary, we develop a series of games from scratch using multiple trees and tables to prove the indifferentiability of the SFPF hash function. -The indifferentiability security proofs of hash functions in [2, 7, 12] only formally show that the so-called message extension attack [7, 17] on the MD construction does not apply to its variants. The techniques employed in the indifferentiability analysis of the SFPF framework, however, also take into consideration other attacks such as pseudo collisions (collisions using distinct I V s) for the MD construction.
Guide to the paper. Section 2 introduces notation and definitions. In Sect. 3, the generic SFPF hash construction is introduced, and its indifferentiability security proof is provided in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we show the indifferentiability of some hash functions in the free-IV setting and constructions that do not fit into the SFPF framework. In Sect. 6, we show that the free-IV hash functions with MD strengthening are indifferentiable from a RO. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, some basic notation and definitions are introduced. Some notation specific to the indifferentiability analysis of the SFPF hash function is introduced in Sect. 4.
Notation
We denote by X Y the concatenation of two binary bit strings X and Y , and by X | j the value of X truncated to its j lower bits. |X | represents the length of the string X in bits. An empty string is denoted by . Assigning to X a random value from {0, 1} z is denoted by X $ ← {0, 1} z . We denote by X ← {0, 1} z assigning a z-bit string to X and by X ← Y assigning the output of the expression Y to X . We denote by R : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n a random oracle with n-bit output.
Any n-bit hash function mode constructed by iterating a compression function f is denoted by H f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . In this paper, we use the notation H f to represent an iterated hash function either based on a compression function f or several distinct compression functions (e.g., f 1 , f 2 , . . .) in accordance with the context being considered. For example, when we deal with the prefix-free (resp. suffix-free) hash function, H f refers to the prefix-free (suffix-free) hash function. Similarly, when we deal with the SFPF design, H f refers to SFPF based on three distinct compression functions f 1 , f 2 and f 3 .
The input message M to a hash function is preprocessed as 
Indifferentiability
Definition 1 [7, 18] A hash function H f with oracle access to an ideal primitive f is said to be (t A , t S , q, ) indifferentiable from a random oracle R if there exists a simulator S, such that for any computationally unbounded distinguisher A with oracle access to (H f , f ) and (R, S) respectively denoted by A (H f , f ) and A (R,S) , it holds that:
The simulator has oracle access to R and runs in time at most t S . The distinguisher A runs in time at most t A and makes at mostueries. H f is said to be (computationally) indifferentiable from R if the bound is a negligible function of the security parameter k, where in the case of hash function k is replaced by n, the output length of hash function.
We denote the maximum number of message blocks in a single query by τ where τ = 1 for ( f /S) and τ ≤ N max for (H f /R). In addition, we denote the total number of queried messages by q. The security parameter k refers to the size of the hash value in bits. For any function U , we denote byÛ the ideal U and byŪ either U orÛ . For example, if H f is a hash function, qH f denotes the total number of queries to either H f or the ideal hash functionĤ f . Note thatĤ f can be also a random oracle R. Similar to the simulators used in the indifferentiability analysis of the MD variants [2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12] , the simulator used in the indifferentiability analysis of the SFPF hash function H f maintains a history of all previous query relations, that is, pairs of adversary queries and simulator responses. However, unlike in the prior works, the simulator presented in this paper does not know the I V value of H f before a query has been made to H f /R. We denote the ith query-response relation by Q R i : {Q R 
Iterated hash function constructions
We review the MD construction and some of its indifferentiable variants proposed by Coron et al. [7] . The other schemes of Coron et al. as well as the EMD and MDP constructions are defined in "Appendix 1".
PFMD constructions. Each PFMD construction uses a padding function g which ensures that for any two messages
Three variants of PFMD are described in Algorithms 5-7 in "Appendix 1".
HMAC and NMAC constructions. The HMAC hash construction (Algorithm 8 in "Appendix 1") hashes a message by applying the same MD f function twice, using the same IV. HMAC is a special case of the NMAC construction that is not discussed in detail here.
ChopMD constructions. The ChopMD construction is an nbit MD hash where s out of n bits of the hash value are chopped, thus producing an (n −s)-bit hash value. Its variant ChopPFMD does the same for the PFMD construction [6] .
SFPF constructions. The SFPF construction is an n-bititerated hash function, with free-IV, which ensures that it is not feasible in polynomial time to use
Building an SFPF hash function construction
In this section, we first present properties that the free-IV hash functions should have in order to be indifferentiable from a RO and then propose SFPF hash function construction.
Prefix-free hash functions. The variants of MD discussed in Sect. 2.3 share the unique property that their last message block is processed differently from the previous blocks in some way. For example, in PFMD f g 2 (M), the last block of M has always a bit '1' as the prefix while all other blocks always start with a '0' bit. Hence, when an adversary A tries to differentiate any of these schemes from RO, the simulator S can recognize the potential last message block in
In this sense, all the variants of MD proven indifferentiable by Coron et al. [7] are prefix-free. In the same way, for these MD variants, the simulator can recognize the potential first message block in A's queries, since these queries have the structure (y 0 ,M), where y 0 is the publicly known I V andM ∈ {0, 1} m is some message block. The simulator S can then predict the probable messages that A can derive from its queries to S in order to compare them with the responses by R. Therefore, S can respond to A's queries appropriately. Now, we formally define a more general definition of a prefix-free hash function compared to the PFMD construction presented in Sect. 2.3. To our knowledge, no formal definitions for prefix-free hash function and suffix-free hash function were provided in the literature although some research works [1] addressed the importance of prefix-freeness in hash functions for the security of applications. Definition 2 A hash function H f with oracle access to an ideal primitive f is said to be (t A , q, ) prefix-free hash function if given H f (I V, M), for any computationally unbounded adversary A with oracle access to H f and f it holds that:
where, the adversary A runs in time at most t A and makes at mostueries. H f is said to be (computationally) prefixfree if the bound is a negligible function of the security parameter k.
Suffix-free hash functions. Any adversary A trying to distinguish a free-IV hash function (H f , f ) from (R, S) can choose any I V value in its queries. Hence, the simulator S can no longer use a known I V value to determine the start of the messages queried by A. However, there could be other unique properties related to the first block that can be used by S to determine the potential first message block. Informally speaking, in hash functions that possess such a property, the adversary A cannot use 
is the padding function and the adversary A runs in time at most t A and makes at mostueries. H f is said to be (computationally) prefix-free if the bound is a negligible function of the security parameter k.
By assuming that the compression function is a FIL-RO, a suffix-free hash can be constructed, for example, by encoding a bit '1' and a bit '0' as the starting bit in the first and the remaining blocks of the message respectively.
Remark 1
We remark that fixed-IV hash functions that are prefix-free are also prefix-free when the I V is made free. However, in this setting, assuming that compression functions are FIL-ROs, prefix-freeness by itself may not be sufficient for the indifferentiability of these hash function modes. We show this in detail in Sect. 5 by demonstrating differentiability attacks on free-IV PFMD Below we show that an iterated hash function that is not prefix-free or suffix-free is not indifferentiable from a RO, demonstrating the significance of these properties in the design of indifferentiable iterated hash functions.
Theorem 1 Any iterated hash function H f that is not prefixfree or suffix-free is differentiable from R O, for any simulator.
Proof Let H f denote an iterated hash function based on an ideal primitive f , and R a random oracle and S a simulator for f . If H f is not (t A , q, ) prefix-free, then there exists an adversary A running in time t A and making at mostueries (to H f and/or f ) for which:
, we can construct A from A, defined as follows: In the above attack, the adversary outputs "1" ifH f is H f with a non-negligible probability > whereas this probability for RO and any simulator would be 2 −n , because the simulator has no knowledge of M to answer adaptively. Hence, for an iterated hash function with/without a free-IV to be indifferentiable, it is necessary for it to be prefix-free. We would now like to state that A is a (t A , q , ) distinguisher  between (H f , f ) and (R, S) , for suitable t A , q and .
On the other hand, if H f is not (t A , q, ) suffix-free, then there exists an adversary A running in time t A and making at mostueries (to H f and/or f ) for which:
, we can construct A from A, defined as follows:
1. Choose random (I V, M) and let Y be the result of apply- In the above attack, the adversary outputs "1" ifH f is H f with a non-negligible probability > whereas this probability for RO and any simulator would be 2 −n , because finding a collision in RO is expected to cost 2 n/2 . Again, we would now like to state that A is a (t A , q , ) distinguisher between (H f , f ) and (R, S), for suitable t A , q and .
Hence, for an iterated hash function with a free-IV to be indifferentiable, it is necessary for it to be both prefix-free and suffix-free. Otherwise, the construction would not be indifferentiable from RO, for any simulator.
Remark 2
In the proof of Theorem 1, we have omitted the details of a padding function that may be used in a hash function that is not prefix-free or suffix-free. However, it has no influence on our analysis because the discussion easily extends to the padded version. More precisely, although different hash functions use different padding functions, many of them append a sequence of bits which includes the length of the original message to the end of the message. Hence, this sequence can also be included in the produced M . It is exactly the approach that is used to do length extension attack on the MD hash function.
SFPF hash functions.
It is possible to construct a hash function that is both suffix-free and prefix-free (SFPF) for messages of at least two blocks. For example, we can encode a message of at least two blocks in the MD construction by prefixing two 0 bits ("00") in the first block (suffix-free padding), prefixing a "10" pair in the last block (prefix-free padding) and prefixing two 1 bits ("11") in every intermediate message block. Hence, for an SFPF hash function construction, the adversary A cannot use H f (I V, M) to construct either
for any I V, I V , M, and M = .
SFPF hash function construction
The SFPF hash function can be constructed as follows: Consider a free-IV iterated hash function based on the FIL-RO compression function f : {0, 1} n+m → {0, 1} n but without MD strengthening. Let M be the arbitrary length message to be processed. We split M into blocks M 1 . . . M N such that each block is of size m − 2 bits, if necessary by appending the last block M N with pad bits. Recall that pad does not include MD strengthening. We let the first f process the first m − 2 bits of M combined with the two suffix-free padding bits and the final f process the last message block combined with the two prefix-free padding bits. Each of the remaining blocks of M is prefixed with two bits, distinct from the combination of the bits used in the first and the last block, and processed by the same compression function f .
Alternatively, we can consider processing the message in the above setting with an iterated hash function based on three distinct FIL-RO compression functions f i : {0, 1} n+m → {0, 1} n for i = {1, 2, 3}. We remark that this description is comparable with that of the 6-round Luby-Rackoff construction based on six distinct FIL-ROs [8] . In this alternative description, we divide M into m-bit blocks M 1 . . . M N (if necessary by appending the last block M N with pad bits). We employ f 1 to process the first m-bit block, f 3 to process the last m-bit block and f 2 to process the intermediate mbit blocks as described in Algorithm 1 and shown in Fig. 1 . We denote by H f the SFPF construction based on f i for i = {1, 2, 3}, and by f we mean f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 . Note that the PFMD f g 2 construction defined in Sect. 2.3 can also be seen as based on two distinct FIL-RO compression functions as it pads last block differently compared to the remaining blocks.
Algorithm 1: Hash construction SFPF
// mark the end return y Our SFPF hash function is generic but not the most generic SFPF. The SFPF design defined in Algorithm 1 is generic from the view that the compression functions f 1 , f 2 and f 3 can be defined in different ways. Basically, for any SFPF hash function design, the way the first block and last block are processed should be distinguished in some way. As noted before, one such way is to have a single compression function in the iteration and processing the first message block with "00" as the prefix, last message block with "10" as the prefix and all intermediate blocks with "11" as the prefix. However, we remark that our SFPF based on 3 distinct compression functions is not the most generic SFPF hash function construction as all SFPF hash functions may not be of this form. That is, it may be possible to provide an SFPF scheme that does not match our framework. For example, by replacing each function f 2 in the iteration in our SFPF with a distinct compression function, an SFPF scheme with a different form can be obtained. In the following section, we consider the indifferentiability analysis of our SFPF hash function design. For any other SFPF constructions based on FIL-RO compression function, it would be possible to prove the indifferentiability following an approach similar to ours, but the details of the games should be defined based on the target SFPF construction.
Indifferentiability analysis of the SFPF hash function
In Theorem 2 of this section, we prove that the SFPF hash function, H f , is indifferentiable from a random oracle R.
Theorem 2
The SFPF hash function H f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n based on three FIL-RO compression functions f 1 , f 2 , 1} n is (t A , t S , q, ) Proof In the following, we only discuss the logic of the simulator used in deriving the indifferentiability security bound for the SFPF hash function. The full proof for this Theorem has been provided in "Appendix 2".
Let S f be a simulator which simulates f 1 , f 2 and f 3 . Hence, we need to program S f such that no distinguisher A can distinguish (except with negligible probability) between the following two scenarios:
-A has oracle access to (H f , ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) ).
-A has oracle access to (R, S f ).
Using this experiment, we define the advantage of A as follows:
The simulator does not see A's queries toH f (either H f or R); however, it can call R when needed for simulation.
Whenever A queriesH f , it cannot directly access the output off 1 andf 2 . A must queryf 1 andf 2 to know about their output. The simulator provides random answers to the new queries of A tof 1 andf 2 . On the other hand, for A's queries tof 3 , the simulator S f should return values in a way "consistent" with H f and R. Hence, the only way by which A can fool the simulator S f is by predicting its responses for the queries tof 1 andf 2 or by finding a collision in the responses of S f (explained below). However, we formally show that neither of these events can occur with high probability. The simulator program presented in Fig. 3 shows the techniques used by S f to respond to A for its queries tof i for i = 1, 2, 3.
The simulator S f keeps a history of all query/responses related tof 1 Similarly, S f keeps a history of all query/responses related tof 2 andf 3 and similar notation for the respective tables can be given.
In addition, the simulator S f maintains different tree structures that include the adversarial query-response connections. The edges of these trees represent adversarial queries, and the nodes refer to the responses of S f . Figure 2 shows possible states of the trees obtained after several queries tō f 1 andf 2 . Since any root in the trees has started from a query tof 1 , any query tof 1 can be considered as the root of the tree. The labels of the edges indicate that queries are answered byf 1 orf 2 . Let M j l be the lth block of the j th queried message and y j l−1 be the corresponding internal state. Note that the superscript j refers to and in the first two several query/response connections in Fig. 2 , and the superscript j is blank (for M l , y l−1 and y l ) in the rightmost case of Fig. 2 .
The simulator uses the functions Get Path and N ew Path to access and update the trees respectively. We explain the functionality of N ew Path, by considering two cases:
The first case is related to a new query (y
, the simulator draws a new edge from the It must be noted that if a collision occurs in the output of S f , then N ew Path may not be able to draw a new edge related to the point properly and it will file, because we have two nodes with the same label and the simulator does not know the new edge should be connected to which one. Hence, in this case, simulator fails. Therefore, the required number of queries to find a collision in the output of S f is a trivial upper bound for indifferentiability of the scheme, this bound is q = 2 n/2 . Precisely, the following bad events may disrupt the simulator's functionality: collides with a label of a tree maintained by simulator or the input of a query tof 2 orf 3 which is not included in any tree. This bad event is indicated by badf 2 in Fig. 3 .
In addition, finding a fixed point in the output of S f increases the size of the tree uncontrollably but for any query to S f it occurs with the probability of 2 −n which is negligible and we omit it (for the given compression function f , the pair of chaining value y i and a message block m i is called a fixed point when we have f (y i , m) = y i ).
Remark 3 Due to the birthday paradox, the upper bound of indifferentiability of any n-bit hash function with an n-bit chaining value is at most 2 n/2 (schemes in [2, 7, 12] have this 
// IV is free
// mark the end return y N N wherein the final compression function is denoted by f 2 and other compression functions by f 1 . The indifferentiability security proof of SFPF-N is similar to that of the SFPF hash function, and the simulator functionality is disclosed in Algorithm 11 in "Appendix 3". .
Conclusion
We proposed a new generic iterated hash function framework called the SFPF construction that works for arbitrary I V s without the provision of MD strengthening and proved that it is indifferentiable from a RO when the compression function is an FIL-RO. This result demonstrates that it is possible to design hash functions indifferentiable from a RO wherein the I V of the hash functions need not be fixed. The positive outcome of this result is that the SFPF framework with MD strengthening generalizes n-bit hash functions based on nbit compression functions and with n-bit state that are proven indifferentiable from a RO.
Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 2
In the following, we provide a proof for Theorem 2.
Proof Let A be the adversary whose goal is to differentiate We analyze the advantage of A by considering Games G i for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 7} that are informally described in the following (formal descriptions of the games are given in "Appendix 4"). We will denote A with access to (playing)
. We start with the game G 0 which directly communicates with (H f , ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) ) and complete the proof with the game G 7 which emulates (R, S f ) . In general, any event that lets C H terminate the game is considered as a bad event. Such events are explained below. It is obvious that G 4 and G 5 are identical until a bad event is set to true in G 5 . This is denoted by bad ← true. Hence, the maximum advantage of A in distinguishing G 5 from G 4 (transient from G 4 to G 5 ) is at most the maximum probability of the occurrence of bad events. Thus:
The probability that the bad events (explained below) 
Appendix 3: Simulator for the SFPF-N hash function
In this section, we present a simulator for the SFPF-N hash function in Algorithm 11. This simulator emulates f 1 and f 2 such that SFPF-N is indifferentiable from R. For simplicity and without loss generality, this simulator assumes that the entire last block is used for MD strengthening. Its running time t S = O(q 2 ), and A's advantage afterueries is bounded by ≤ O(τ 2 · q 2 · 2 −n ).
Appendix 4: Formal description of the Games used in the indifferentiability analysis of the SFPF hash function
In this section, we provide figures that formally describe the games used in the indifferentiability analysis of the SFPF hash function. See Figs. 4, 5, 6 , 7, 8.
